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Rethinking Notice
By Jack M. Beermiann*
PA § 553 (b)(3) requires agencies
engaged in informal ruleinak
ing to provide notice of "either
the terms or substance of the proposed
rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved." In most cases, agen-
cies publish the complete text of their
proposed rules, together with a preain-
ble describing the need for the rule
and the major considerations of policy
and law that are raised by the proposal.
Coninents often convince agencies to
make changes to their proposed rules.
This, of course, is the whole point of
the process. Difficulties arise, however,
when, in reaction to coninents,
agencies promulgate rules that differ
substantially from the initial proposal.
In such cases, parties whose interests
are harmed by the changes to the rule
may claim that the process was unfair
because they could not have antici-
pated the scope of the changes and thus
did not have an adequate opportunity
to participate in the ruleinaking.
The issue addressed in this essay is
the standard that reviewing courts
should apply when deciding whether
changes between a proposed rule
and a final rule render the notice
inadequate under APA § 553. I have
written about this issue before, taking
the position that courts should stick
closely to the language of § 553 and
generally allow agencies great leeway
in making changes between proposals
and final rules. In this essay, I raise
some concerns about my earlier posi-
tion that have led ine to reconsider the
issue. In short, I now believe there is
a good instrumental case to be made
against strict adherence to the text of
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the APA and in favor of requiring a
new round of notice and coninent
when agencies make unanticipated
changes to their proposals when
promulgating final rules.
In 2007, my colleague Gary Lawson
and I published an article arguing
that courts had strayed too far from
the APA in evaluating the degree to
which agencies inay make changes
to rules between proposal and proin-
ulgation. (See Jack M. Beerinann &
Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont
Yankee, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
856, 896 (2007).) We concluded
that the standards courts currently
apply in these cases was inconsistent
with language of § 553: "Because
the statute permits the agency to
limit its notice to 'the subjects and
issues involved,' our view of the best
understanding of § 553 is that no new
notice and coninent is required if the
final rule is within the subjects and
issues involved in the proposal, even
if the direction of the final rule is
substantially different from the direc-
tion suggested by the notice."
We also concluded that this
standard was required by the spirit,
if not the letter, of the Supreme
Court's Vermont Yankee decision (Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978)), in which the Court held that
reviewing courts do not have author-
ity to impose procedural requirements
on agencies beyond those specified in
applicable statutes and rules.
In early cases, the courts were very
tolerant when coninents led agen-
cies to make significant changes to
proposed rules before promulgation.
The courts applied the language of
the APA and rejected arguments for
a new round of notice and coninent
even when agencies made significant
changes between the notice and the
final rule. This attitude is exemplified
by the following observation from
a 1954 Court of Appeals opinion:
"Surely every time the Corninission
decided to take account of some
additional factor it was not required
to start the proceedings all over again.
If such were the rule the proceed-
ings might never be terminated."
(Logansport Broad. Corp. v. United
States, 210 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir.
1954).)
Some standard is necessary to
determine whether changes between
notices and final rules are so signifi-
cant that interested parties did not
truly have notice of the agency's
proposal. Without a standard, an
agency could propose a rule with no
intention of actually adopting it and
then promulgate something radically
different. This would frustrate the
entire purpose of the notice-and-
coninent process because affected
parties would not have any opportu-
nity to coninent on the agency's
true proposal.
Despite these concerns, Gary
Lawson and I previously condemned
the various tests courts had developed
for determining whether a new round
of notice and coninent is required.
In these tests the court have asked
whether the final rule is a "logical
outgrowth" of the notice (and some-
times the coninents) already given;
whether the agency made a "material
alteration" between the notice and the
final rule; and whether the final rule
is "in character with" the original
notice. All of the tests boil down to
the saine basic question: was notice
specific enough to provide interested
parties with a reasonable opportunity
to coninent to protect their interests?
In our view then, the courts had not
been sufficiently tolerant of agencies
when changes were made between
notices and final rules.
Although the Supreme Court has
not weighed in definitively on the
proper understanding of § 553's notice
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requirement, in its 2007 opinion in
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007), the Court
cited the "logical outgrowth" test
with apparent approval. However,
the Court's apparent endorsement of
the "logical outgrowth" test does not
establish that the lower courts have
been properly applying § 553.
Long Island Health Care reviewed a
Department of Labor rule concerning
treatment of companion workers
under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). After receiving coninents
critical of its proposal to continue a
limited exception for some workers,
the Department decided to subject
all companion workers hired by
third parties to the requirements
of the FLSA. The Court rejected a
challenge to the agency's notice by
those providers, reasoning that " [s]
ince the proposed rule was simply
a proposal, its presence meant that
the Department was considering the
matter; after that consideration the
Department might choose to adopt
the proposal or to withdraw it." 551
U.S. at 175.
This reasoning raises questions
concerning the application of the
"logical outgrowth" test in at least
some of the cases in which it has
been applied. For example, one of
the most well-known decisions is
the Fourth Circuit's Chocolate Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105
(4th Cir. 1985). In that case, the
Chocolate Manufacturers challenged
the Department of Agriculture's
decision to remove flavored milk,
including chocolate milk, from the
list of approved foods that could
be purchased by benefits recipients
under a program designed to ensure
adequate nutrition to pregnant
women and children. The proposed
rule continued the inclusion of
flavored milk on the list, and a
lengthy preamble discussed sugared
cereal and sugar in juice but did not
mention flavored milk. Despite the
fact that 78 coninents convinced the
Department to remove flavored milk
from the list, the court held that the
Chocolate Manufacturers did not
have adequate notice that flavored
milk might be removed. While the
court may be correct that the lack
of mention of flavored milk in the
preamble may have lulled the plaintiff
into believing that removal of its
product would not be considered,
the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Long Island Home Care suggests that
the Chocolate Manufacturers should
have understood that the proposal
to continue the inclusion of flavored
milk on the list of approved foods
might not be adopted.
Gary Lawson and I previously
supported our critique of the way
the courts have applied the notice
requirement by relying on the
Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee rule,
which prohibits courts from imposing
procedural requirements on agen-
cies not contained in any applicable
statute or rule. As the Supreme Court
explained, allowing courts to increase
procedural requirements beyond
those required by law would lead
to great unpredictability - which
would give agencies the incentive to
overproceduralize, thus losing the
benefits of the inforinal ruleinaking
process prescribed by Congress. Thus,
aggressive judicial monitoring of
changes between proposed and final
rules under unclear standards like
the "logical outgrowth" test would
incentivize agencies to conduct multi-
ple rounds of notice and coninent
to ensure against reversal, the exact
procedural situation condemned in
Vermont Yankee. Even worse, strict
application of the notice requirement
in this context would undercut the
very purpose of the entire procedure
by discouraging agencies from incor-
porating what they learn from the
coninents into their final rules.
When I teach Chocolate
Manufacturers in my Administrative
Law course, I urge students to think
about the decision in light of the
Vermont Yankee rule, and ask whether
the Chocolate Manufacturers might
have chosen not to coninent so as
not to draw attention to the flavored
milk issue and perhaps to preserve the
notice objection if flavored milk was
removed from the list. The "punch
line" is to push the argument that
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courts should approve any notice that
meets the statutory requirement of
containing "either terms or substance
of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved"
- which the notice in Chocolate
Manufacturers surely did.
This year during the discussion
the class's attention turned to the
cost of coninenting and whether
each of those interested in preserving
each item on the Department of
Agriculture's list should have spent
the time, energy, and money to
submit a coninent. Was there any
realistic chance that the Department
of Agriculture would remove unfla-
vored whole milk from the list of
foods available in a program focusing
on nutrition for women and young
children? It is conceivable that some
group of coninents might attack the
inclusion of milk - perhaps due to
its fat content, the hormones used to
stimulate milk production in cows, or
its alleged connection in some circles
to the incidence of some forms of
cancer. But similar attacks could be
made concerning other products on
the list such as baby formula, cheese,
cereal, juice, eggs, peanut butter, and
numerous varieties of beans and peas,
all of which were included in at least
some of the food packages covered
by the program. Is it cost-effective to
encourage every single beneficiary
of a proposed rule to coninent in
support of the proposal?
Class discussion suggested that,
while it is costly when an agency is
forced to conduct a second coninent
period when coninents convince
it to make an unanticipated change
to a proposed rule, it may be more
costly for all regulatory beneficiaries
to feel the need to submit coninents
every time they have a conceivable
economic interest in the outcome
of a ruleinaking proceeding. If the
occasional additional coninent
period required under the "logical
outgrowth" test is less costly than
producing numerous additional
coninents under a standard allow-
ing agencies to make more changes
continued on next page
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without an additional coninent
period, then - contrary to what
Gary Lawson and I previously argued
- the current application of the
"logical outgrowth" and related tests
may make economic sense. Further,
additional coninents impose costs
on agencies that must analyze and
respond to them. See Wendy Wagner,
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and
Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321,
1325 (2010). If every single party
whose interests could conceivably be
affected by changes to a proposed rule
submits coninents, the agency will
have to devote significantly greater
resources to analyzing the coninents
and addressing then in the concise
general statenent of basis and purpose
of the final rules.
I do not mean to suggest that courts
should freely require agencies to
conduct additional coninent periods
whenever their final rules differ from
their proposals. Courts should do so
only when the changes made were
truly not foreseeable by the party
whose interests were prejudiced by a
change. Interested parties should be
encouraged to coninent whenever it
appears that there is a realistic possi-
bility that the rule might be changed
to their detriment. They should not,
however, be expected to coninent
when such changes are not reasonably
foreseeable.
E-ruleinaking might also ainelio-
rate some of the problems agencies
have had in the past when coninents
point then in an unexpected direc-
tion. If coninents are quickly posted
to the agency's website in a form that
is easily accessible by affected parties,
those parties are more likely to be able
to anticipate the need for coninents
during the initial coninent period.
What of the Vermont Yankee rule?
The Vermont Yankee rule itself was
built largely upon pragmatic concerns
involving preserving the benefits of
inforinal processes and not creating an
incentive to overproceduralize. I still
find the textualist methodology for
construing § 553 that Gary Lawson
and I employed to be generally more
consistent with Vermont Yankee than
with other alternatives. However, as I
observed in Common Law and Statute
Law in Administrative Law, 63 Adinin.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (2011), the current
approach to the notice question in the
federal courts may be "consistent with
the traditional role of courts engaged
in statutory construction, which is
to apply the language and intent of
the statute in a way that makes sense
in light of the policies underlying
the statutory scheme." Perhaps it is
unrealistic to expect the federal courts
to sacrifice sound policy concerns
on the altar of fidelity to the text of a
statute passed by Congress nearly 70
years ago. C)
Remarks of Kevin M. Stack continued from page 11
result of these principles, the text of
the regulation and its accompanying
statement of basis and purpose stand
in a unique relationship: Together
they constitute the act of regulation
through the notice- and-coninent
process. The conclusion I draw is that
it does not make sense to interpret the
rules independently from their state-
inent of basis and purpose. They form
a couplet.
Principle 2: Interpret regulations
in accordance with their purposes.
Regulations iinpleinent statutory
purposes. They are designed to direct
our behavior toward some goal -
cleaner air, more efficient markets,
reducing the likelihood of fraud, and
so on. As such, regulations are goal-
oriented documents. This, too, has an
implication for interpretation: They
should be interpreted then in light
of their purposes or goals, what they
seek to do.
Putting these two principles
together yields a basic framework for
regulatory interpretation: Interpret the
text of a regulation in light of its purposes,
purposes discerned from the text of the
regulation itself and set forth in the regula-
tion's statement ofbasis and purpose. Thus
the core idea is to treat an agency's
public and authoritative justifications
for its regulations as more than an
elaborate exercise necessary to survive
judicial review; they also create
coninitinents that continue to guide
the meaning of the regulations. In the
article, I argue that this approach is
not subject to the critiques of the use
of legislative history or purposivisin in
statutory interpretation.
I also defend this approach as practi-
cal - "out-of-the-box ready" - for
use by lawyers and courts. For regula-
tory lawyers, this approach - use the
purposes articulated in the preamble
to guide interpretation of the regula-
tion - gives concrete directions for
how to handle regulatory ambiguity.
It also provides a consistent and work-
able approach for courts to employ,
whether interpreting a regulation
under Chevron or under Auer/Seminole
Rock or other doctrines. Under this
approach, a court would ask two
questions: Whether the prospective
interpretation of the regulation is
(1) permitted by its text and also
(2) consistent with the regulation's
purposes set forth in its text and state-
inent of basis and purpose.
At a more general level, in an era
in which agencies are frequently
characterized as overly political, this
approach recognizes and affirms a role
for law in guiding agency action. It
sees regulations as more than creat-
ing a zone of agency discretion, but
as launching a policy to which the
agency owes allegiance. Thank you
very much. C)
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